On 23th, April, Dr. Jun Zhang from Economics Discipline Group, School of Business, University of Technology Sydney visit our school and gave a seminar titled "Optimal Mechanism Design with Aftermarket Interactions". He have published many papers in top journals of Economics, e.g., Economic Journal, Journal of Economic Theory.
A revenue maximizing mechanism designer chooses a mechanism in the primary market to sell an object to privately informed entrants. The winning entrant then engages in Cournot competition with an incumbent in the aftermarket. The designer has perfect control in the primary market but imperfect control in the aftermarket. We fully characterize optimal mechanisms under general conditions. When the designer has partial control" in the aftermarket, the constructed optimal mechanism is deter-ministic and the designer fully reveals the winning entrant's private production cost to the incumbent. When the designer has no control" in the aftermarket, similar results hold.